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In this paper the case made by Klein (1975) and Hayek (1976) for competitive bank monies is reconsidered.  To do so we
build a model of the demand for bank money that derives from money’s ability to separate commodity purchases from
sales across time and so avoid the trading costs implied by barter and the double coincidence of wants.  Such a model
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provision and stable money prices.
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1Competitive Bank Monies: Reconsidering Hayek and Klein from a
transactions perspective 
In this paper the case made by Klein (1975) and Hayek (1976) for competitive bank monies is
reconsidered.  To do so I build a model of the demand for bank money that derives from money’s ability
to separate commodity purchases from sales across time and so avoid the trading costs implied by barter
and the double coincidence of wants.  Here differentiated monies are produced by profit maximizing firms
(banks) who sell a valued financial intermediary instrument to households in order to consolidate purchasing
power to finance intertemporal differences in household consumption profiles.   Banks then specialize in2
bringing together locational specific borrowers and lenders and profit by their ability to locate opportunities
and enforce repayment at lower cost than can either private individuals or bank rivals.
I begin by following Klein and Hayek in assuming that individuals have perfect information either on the
aggregate size of each bank’s note issue (deposits) or the price level, and the rate of new note issuance or
rate of price change.   This postpones dealing with the asymmetric-information bank cheating problem3
(sometimes called the time inconsistency problem) alleged to undermine the case for competitive banking.4
It also allows focus on the characteristics of the steady state (instead of having to describe more fully the
process of adjustment or the full dynamic model underlying the model’s equilibrium).  By allowing actual
and expected prices to differ only at the end, we can better see how bank cheating is just an extreme
version of the more general problem of determining and rewarding improvements in bank quality (already
present under perfect price information).
I. The Individual and Market Demand for Bank Money
Rather than assume that individuals have an inherent demand for the monetary services that only bank
money can provide, I begin with the recognition that the double coincidence required of barter exchange
makes exchange more costly.   In our transaction cost model, then, individuals both hold and use money5
to economize on the individual-specific transaction costs of finding appropriate trading partners.  While the
use of money will not eliminate trading costs, the cost savings achieved by its use and the concomitant
ability to advance specialization (by allowing the temporal separation of purchases from sale) motivates our
demand for money.   To facilitate this transaction demand, each bank provides a distinctive money (note6
or deposit) together with potentially different types of bank services. This allows different bank monies to
be cost minimizing in different contexts.   For individuals to willingly use different monies in making their7
day-to-day transactions, there must exist the ability to exchange monies at a sufficiently low cost to make
multi-money banking viable.  For individuals to hold more than one bank money, even more is required.
2Given the information and other setup costs of accessing the money-exchange or bank clearing services
required of a multi-money system, it is assumed uneconomic for each individual to hold more than one
money and utilize more than one bank.
Because of the focus on trade and its costs, I abstract from production, i.e., the production of all goods
except for the K distinct monies.  Hence the ith individual is assumed to be endowed (a la Patinkin) with`
a flow of up to J nondurable consumption goods each period, x , and to have accumulated an optimal leveleij
of financial wealth, W .  Some portion of that wealth will be held as bank money, M , and the remainingi ik
portion in the form of a single illiquid asset, p B, that earns its own rate of return of i  each period.   HenceB 8k i hh
denominated in terms of the kth bank’s money, p W = M  + p B.   Finally, the individual’s costs of tradek i ik k iB 9
are incorporated through a transaction cost function, t , wherei
t  = t[v , M /p , ß , ß], (1)i i ik k k
and where v  = 3(p /p )[(x  - x ) ] . The first argument in (1) is a measure of the volume of tradei jk k ij ije 2 1/2
undertaken by the ith individual, v .  The cost of trade is assumed to increase at an increasing rate in its reali
volume so that representing the partial derivative with subscripts, both t  and t  > 0.   The secondv vv 10
argument reflects the savings permitted by the use of money.  Using a financial instrument that is generally
accepted in exchange secures final consumption goods at lower cost than can finding reciprocal trading
partners directly and acquiring the desired commodity bundle under barter.   The cost savings achieved11
are assumed sufficient to motivate the holding of one of the bank monies.  Larger real money holdings
permit larger discrepancies in timing between the arrival of receipts and the need to make payment and so
reduce the cost of subordinating the timing of consumption to the dictates of trade.   In common with the12
literature, however, the benefit of holding  larger real money balances is assumed to encounter diminishing
returns.  Third, the cost of using any particular money will depend upon its perceived quality, ß .   A higherk 13
quality money is one whose future value is more predictable and hence more acceptable in exchange so
that both holding and using such a money lowers the expected costs of trade to the individual.  Finally, the
value of using any money will also depend on the qualities of the other monies in the system and hence on
the quality of the monetary exchange system as a whole, ß.  In this sense the absence of a money clearing
mechanism or an organized money exchange market would impose higher costs on each individual using
money.  Improvements in banking institutions and/or the mechanisms that coordinate banking will then
confer joint benefits on participating banks and individual money holders.
With this background, the choice problem facing price taking individuals can be modelled as one of
choosing the consumption quantities of J commodities and the particular money type to hold that maximizes
(x , M ) = U(x .. x ) + ?[3p x  + r M  + i (p W  - M ) - 3p x  - p t(v , M /pk, ß , ß)], (2)ij ik i1 ij jk ij Mk ik hh k i ik jk ij k i ik ke
where the utility function, U(.), is assumed to be strictly concave, and where the summations in the budget
3constraint are over the complete set of J consumption goods.  The money choice requires the individual to
compare the total utility generated by each of the M ’s and then choose the money that is individually bestk
from the set of K alternatives.  Because money enters the maximization problem only through the budget
constraint, the individual will choose the money that best lowers trading costs.
The set of first order conditions for an internal optimum for ith individual who chooses to hold the kth
money is
M/Mx  = 0   Y  U  = ?(p  + p t v ) = ?p (1 + (-1) t ),   c = 1 (2) for x  < (>) x ,  j = 1,2,..J, (3)ij Xij jk k v Xij jk v ij ijc e
M/MM  = 0 Y  (i  - r ) = - t . (4)ik hh Mk (Mk/p)
Imposing the second order conditions, the set of J equations in (3) together with condition (4) for the
optimum quantity of money (and the cost minimization criteria for the choice of the particular money, k) are
sufficient to solve for the J + 1 unknowns given the set of commodity prices p , ...p ,..p , the kth money1k jk Jk
price index, p , the interest paid on the holdings of money k, r , and the return on the alternative to holdingk Mk
money, i .  Substituting the first order conditions back into the budget constraint results in the determinationhh
of the appropriate demand (and supply) functions.
Before continuing into the supply side of the model, it is worthwhile pausing to compare these results with
the outcome that would be found under the more traditional (Walrasian) zero transaction cost case.  First
and most obvious, without putting money into the utility function there would be no demand for money in
the zero transaction cost case.  In addition, the marginal rate of substitution among commodities would
always equal the real exchange rate (without a transaction cost wedge).  Second, because in our model
transactions costs increase with the volume of trade, the quantities of goods traded will be smaller than
those traded in the zero transaction cost case.  From (3), net demanders can be seen to face a higher price
of purchasing goods while net suppliers realize a lower net price on selling (as compared to zero transaction
cost case).  It follows that to the extent that the use of a better money lowers these trading costs on the
margin, money’s use increases the volume of trade at the same time it increases the utility realized through
trade.   Third, note that the wedge introduced by transactions costs has a different effect across the goods14
traded versus the goods consumed and, because individual trading plans differ, even uniform trading costs
have a differential impact on individuals depending on their particular endowments and tastes.  Because the
same markup is applied to all traded goods, the presence of transactions costs reduces the quantity of
goods traded but produces no substitution effect on the relative quantities of goods purchased (or sold).15
Fourth, the particular money chosen is the one that generates the greatest savings and hence permits the
largest possible consumption bundle.   Hence the substitution possibilities implied by the use of equation16
(4) define the individual’s choice of the optimal quantity of money given that the kth money has been
chosen.  Cost minimization means that at some cost the individual will switch completely to holding another
money.  There is then a discontinuity in each individual’s demand for any particular money.  Because all
4individuals differ in their initial endowments and particular tastes, however, aggregation over all individuals
can be expected to smooth out any discontinuity in the market demand curve for each of the K monies.
Finally, note that the demand for the nominal quantity of the kth money, M , is determined only becausek
the k money prices have been taken as given.  That is, the analysis determines a real demand for money
that is neutral, invariant to once-and-for-all proportional changes in the money stock and all k money
prices.
Given uniform price taking behaviour by the N individuals, the above system is sufficient to solve for a set
of market demand functions for each of the K monies (banks) assumed to be operating in the model.  In
general form, these can be written as
(M /p )  = 3(M /p )  = M/p[(i  - r ), s , ß , ß, endowments, distribution],   i = 1,..N. (5)k k ik k hh Mk k kd d
The demand for any particular bank money can be raised by raising the interest paid on its notes or deposits
(so reducing the opportunity cost of holding), by increasing the services offered, and/or by making its future
exchange value more predictable and so increasing its quality.   Finally, the demand for each bank money17
depends upon the quality of the banking system.   Improvements in that quality could come through a18
reduction in the variability of all bank money prices (or rates of inflation) or through institutional
improvements in the exchangeability of bank monies.19
II. The Supply of Bank Money
In this model, banks supply notes (deposits) of quality, ß , pay a pecuniary rate of return, r , and providek Mk
a level of services, s , to individual demanders and use the real resources acquired to relend to otherk
households through bank loans or to purchase bonds, new or outstanding.  Both are assumed to yield a net
rate of return of i .   Banks are intermediaries, specialists in providing household liquidity, in seeking outk 20
location-specific lending opportunities, and in policing loan repayment.  This specialization allows banks
to offer households lower borrowing, higher lending rates while still realizing a net return that is higher than
individuals can earn lending directly.  The superiority of each bank, however, is limited by the extent of its
local market--by its ability to locate reliable borrowers with superior repaying prospects.  Scarce lending
opportunities and costly funds imply that banks will undertake first their most profitable, least risky lending
opportunities before moving on to less their promising alternatives.  For each bank, then, the expected
return decreases on the margin as a function the scale of its lending activity.  This we capture by assuming
that i  = i(R , M /p ) with i  < 0, where R  allows for some banks to have net advantages arising fromk k k k M/P k
different specializations.  In the very short run, then, the bank can increase its nominal note issue by
purchasing bonds or making new loans in terms of its notes (or deposits).   In the longer run, however,21
each bank can maintain a larger real volume of outstanding notes (real deposits) only if it can raise the
marginal return received on the associated higher stock of outstanding loans or it can lower the cost of
5raising  the permanently larger inflow of funds.
In the steady state, then, the kth bank will choose a rate of return to set on its deposits, r , a level ofMk
banking services to depositors, s , and the level of enforcement/coordination needed to maintain a moneyk
quality level, ß , in order to maximizek
p (r , s , ß ) = [i (M /p ) - r )](M /p ) - c(M , s , ß ) k = 1,2,...K (6)k Mk k k k k k Mk k k k k k
where the first term in (6) represents the steady state flow of bank income and the second term, c(.),
represents the real cost to the bank of producing distinctive real money balances (the notes (deposits),
services, and quality underlying its demand for money).  We follow the literature in assuming that the cost
of producing physical bank notes (new deposits) is negligible so that the partial derivative c  = 0.  On theM
other hand, the cost of providing a higher level of service to depositors is positive as is the cost of
structuring and enforcing the timing of loan repayments and bond purchases to maintain a higher level of
quality control (produce less variability in its outstanding money issue and hence money prices).  Both cs
and c  > 0.  ßk 22
Given continuity in the demand for money function in (5) and an expected level of aggregate quality, ß, the
bank’s first order conditions for an internal optimum for profit maximization are
Mp /Mr  = 0  Y  (i  - r )(M /p ) + i (M /p ) (M /p ) = M /p , (7)k Mk k Mk k k r M/p k k r k k k kM M
Mp /Ms    = 0  Y  (i  - r )(M /p )  + i (M /p ) (M /p ) = c (8)k k k Mk k k sk M/p k k sk k k sk
Mp /Mß   = 0  Y  (i  - r )(M /p )  + i (M /p ) (M /p ) = c . (9)k k k Mk k k ß M/p k k ß k k ßk k k
In each equation above, the left hand term represents the marginal benefit of changing one of the bank’s
control variables.  In equation (7) it is the net benefit derived by raising the rate paid on bank notes
(deposits); in (8), the benefit of raising the level of bank services; and in (9), the marginal benefit of raising
the quality of bank’s control over the variability of its money prices.  All raise revenue by increasing the
quantity of real balances households choose to hold (offset somewhat by the falling real return that banks
can realize on the larger stock of outstanding loans it must maintain in relation to the higher level of
deposits).  The right hand side term represents the corresponding marginal cost.  Given that the kth bank
is viable, i.e., bank profits are non negative, diminishing returns in lowering transactions costs through larger
real money holdings and increasing costs in maintaining these levels are sufficient to produce an internal
solution for s  and ß .  The decreasing returns that the bank experiences when expanding its aggregatek k
portfolio of loans reduces the net return to all bank strategies and keeps the marginal revenue associated
6with higher real balances positive in the first order condition for r .Mk 23
Given that (6) is nonnegative, equations (5) through (9) are sufficient to solve for the optimal levels of
service and bank quality provided by bank k along with the rate it will offer on its notes (or deposits).  The
imposition of (5) through (9) for each bank together with the nonnegative profit condition yields a solution
for each bank that remains open.  The addition of the zero profit condition for the marginal bank allows the
model to solve for the number of banks in a Nash equilibrium in which each bank optimally sets its bank
rate, level of bank services and level of monetary control given the behaviour of its rivals.  Through these
individual decisions a level of aggregate bank quality is implied, a level that in equilibrium must be consistent
with the perceived quality of the banking system that underlying the expected demand curves facing each
bank.  Because of the variety permitted in the model (both in terms of individuals demands and bank
specialties), it is unlikely that only one bank will survive in equilibrium.  Hence without loss of generality,
we assume that the industry equilibrium consists of K banks, each offering a distinctive money, perhaps
distinctive rates on its bank notes (deposits), service level, and optimal quality.  Open entry into the banking
industry implies that the K +1  potential entrant cannot earn normal profits.st
Note that as thus far discussed, the model has solved only for the equilibrium level of real balances and that
neither the nominal quantity of each bank money nor its price level can be determined separately.  Because
individuals have full information on the exchange value of each nominal unit (so that cheating on the future
value of money is impossible) individuals will be indifferent to the nominal quantity/price level combination
that yields the same level of real balances.  Since nominal quantities can be produced at zero cost, banks
are also indifferent to the quantity produced.  In this case higher rates of change of nominal money (the
faster depreciation of purchasing power) can be compensated for fully through higher nominal rates of
return given to money holders and charged to money borrowers.  In Klein’s terms, the model produces
a metastable equilibrium in which real values are fully determinate but the level and rate of change of each
particular money price can be determined only through the addition of factors from outside of the model.24
What is less apparent from the discussion is that the model permits the existence of a number of different
Nash equilibrium solutions (that can be Pareto ordered), depending in part on the initial beliefs held by
individuals and banks on the level of aggregate bank quality present in the system.  Over some range, the
solution described above will not be unique and different sets of beliefs can be self-sustaining in equilibrium.
Why this result can occur is best approached by considering more explicitly the requirements of the
coordinating mechanism(s) needed to support multiple money exchange.
III. Hayek, the Money Exchange Market and the Transactions Approach
For a multiple money system to work, each bank money must be generally acceptable in trade and this is
feasible only if there exists some mechanism(s) by which the monies acquired in commodity sales and not
reused in contemporaneous purchases can be exchanged for the money chosen to be held over time.  The
extent of that service and its associated cost must be such that intermediated trade with money remains
7economic.  It follows that an institutional framework coordinating money exchange with a level of aggregate
service ß is implicit in the model discussed above.  If transaction costs were zero it would matter not
whether these services are provided by banks (through a clearing house arrangement), by individuals
themselves, or by an independent agency that intermediates the different bank monies.  As long as entry
was open and service providers were distinguishable, the organizational form will evolve to provide this
service at lowest cost.  Somewhat arbitrarily, then, we begin our analysis by following Hayek in assuming
that the low cost institutional solution will be an independently operated money exchange market for the
K fiat bank monies.  The level of that service money exchange service then feeds back into our analysis as
aggregate bank quality, ß.   25
In such a money exchange market, there will exist at each point in time an exchange ratio for each bank
money in terms of each of the other bank monies.  Should the same basket of goods be used to define the
price index that measures the purchasing power of each bank’s money, the exchange ratio will reflect
directly the relative bank prices of the common basket of goods and hence relative purchasing power.26
More explicitly, the exchange ratio between the monies of banks k and q will be e  / the number of unitskq
of k’s money per unit of q bank’s money = p /p .  k q
Given that all fluctuations in bank money prices increase (real) money trading costs, the transactions cost
approach adopted is perhaps the natural way to introduce price level stability endogenously into the
analysis.  That is, because each individual holds money only to reduce trading costs and because these cost
savings arise primarily from not having to subordinate consumption to exchange, any reduction in the
number of relative price calculations needed to plan final trades and/or any reduction in the number of
trades that variable prices induce will lower trading costs.  It follows that any change in the underlying
money exchange process that reduces the complexity of trading plans and frequency of inter-money
exchange will increase the value of using that bank’s money and so its demand.  Stated alternatively,
because the number of relative price calculations and commodity trades needed to maintain the constancy
of real money holdings (and real consumption flows) increase with both the variance in money prices and
divergence of the inflation rate on either side of zero, the transactions demand for money will fall even if the
holder of the kth money is fully compensated for the perfectly predictable time cost of holding nominal units
of the kth money.27
In the competition for customers, then, any bank that can provide greater price stability (not just greater
predictability) will face a higher demand for its bank money.  In this sense, our analysis would seem to
concur with Hayek’s belief that a competitive money system would result in stable as well as predictable
money prices.   Under the constraint of competition, rival banks succeed and profit by providing the28
bundle of monetary characteristics – pecuniary return, level of bank service and level of money quality –
demanded by their customers.   Even with full information, individual money holders prefer prices that are29
stable and competitive banks can deliver such an outcome in equilibrium.  
Should all banks succeed in delivering price stability, the exchange ratios across all bank monies will remain
constant.  Moreover, any change in that exchange ratio would immediately indicate the inability or
8unwillingness of one bank (or both) to maintain the constancy of their relative purchasing power.  Whether
desired or not, changes in the money exchange ratio signal a change in relative bank performance and hence
relative bank quality. With perfect information on all nominal magnitudes, the assumption maintained in this
section, an additional source of information on bank quality generates no additional value.  However, when
actual and expected prices can diverge, the money exchange market can play an important information role
in the functioning of a competitive money system.  It is this policing role that exchange rate information can
provide that underlies Hayek’s belief that a competitive monetary system will also be a stable price
system.30
IV. Individual and Aggregate Bank Quality in a Multi-Money Banking
System
Were banks truly independent of each other, the net private and social cost of producing bank money
would be equal and this would imply, in the absence of the cheating problem, that competition among banks
could be relied upon to produce the socially optimal output bundle. This is the case implicit in Hayek’s
competitive result.  On the other hand, the transactions perspective makes it apparent that banks are
interdependent.  Because aggregate quality depends upon the qualities of all the banks in the system, the
benefit arising to any individual bank of establishing a level of bank quality will be a function of the quality
levels adopted by the other banks in the system.  Moreover, the aggregate benefit created will be shared.
For the individual, the value of holding money depends ultimately upon what one can get in return and
because a multi-money system necessitates the acquisition and resale of other bank monies, the benefit of
holding any specific bank money will depend in part upon the quality of the money arising elsewhere in the
system.  In the same way that the cost of using a single bank money rises with its price variability (bank
quality), the cost of using a multi-money banking system will rise with a rise in the variance of all bank
money prices.
It follows that the holder of any particular bank money will be concerned with the stability both of that
bank’s specific money prices and other money prices relative to the chosen standard.  Because less overall
variability is desired, any particular bank faces a potential tradeoff in the competitive quest to win
customers.  Less variation in money prices can be produced by having the bank’s inflation rate converge
on the inflation rate adopted by the other banks in the system (in which case money exchange rates will
remain constant) or by pursuing the greater stability of the price level of its own particular medium of
exchange.  It is because the pursuit of the latter can increase the former that price stability will not
necessarily be the outcome that arises under market competition.  The larger the numbers of competing
banks, the more likely it is that convergence on inflation rates will dominate the incentive to target the level
and variation of individual prices about zero.  
These considerations suggest that there are at least three aspects to bank quality that merit attention:  first,
the aggregate variance of all money prices defined as the variance of the portfolio of individual bank
variances;  second, the divergence of the particular bank’s inflation rate relative to the mean rate of31
9inflation; and third, the cost of operating the money exchange institution.  That is,
ß = ß(s , *p  - p *, C(mm)), with ß  ß  and ß  < 0, (10)2ß k mean s ? k C
where s , p , and C(mm) represent, respectively, the variance of all bank money prices, the inflation rate2ß k
of the kth bank, and the costs of operating the money exchange system.
While we have focussed on the potential tradeoff, the two ways of reducing aggregate price variation need
not be incompatible so that the converge of all banks on price stability is indeed one possible Nash
equilibrium.  In addition, it is an equilibrium that will Pareto dominate the other Nash equilibria.
Nevertheless, as will be shown more formally below, should banks have already converged on a low but
non zero inflation rate, it may not pay any single bank to diverge from that initial position.  That is, any single
bank that chooses to diverge by producing a lower inflation rate to produce more stable own prices will
immediately have its exchange rate appreciate relative to rivals. This in turn imposes on its money holders
the higher cost of transacting over an ever widening range of expected future transaction prices.  It is then
likely that there will exist a range of common inflation rates from which the competitive bank will choose
not to diverge, where the increased benefit to be derived from having a higher level of particular bank
quality will be more than offset from the higher cost of producing a rate of price change that is out of step
with the rest of the industry.   The inability to collude under competition keeps the banks from being able32
to lower the industry average to zero (while preserving industry convergence).
Because the aggregate quality of the banking system consists of the qualities of its individual parts, any
change in one bank’s inflation rate or bank quality will produce a direct effect on the aggregate quality
utilized by all other banks in the banking system.  This means that each bank will not receive all of the
benefit created by its provision of higher individual quality and so will under-provide and tend to free-ride
on the quality produced by others.  From each bank’s perspective, the cost saving that rises from any
reduction in the provision of individual bank quality will be a complete private gain to the bank initiating that
change while the overall loss in demand associated with lower aggregate bank quality is shared amongst
all of the banks in the system.
The significance of this external effect on behaviour can be seen by allowing the total effect of a change in
individual bank quality to be incorporated into the bank’s first order condition.  Allowing for the effect of
individual bank quality, ß , on the quality of the banking system, ß, the first order condition in (9) (that heldk
ß constant) now becomes
(i - r )[(M /p )  + (M /p ) ß  +3 (M /p ) ß   ] + i (M /p ) (M /p ) = c ,   j = 1..K, jk, (11)Mk k k ßk k k ß ß j j j ß ß M/p k k ßk k k ßkk k
where ß  > 0 and (M /p )  > 0.  The second term in the square brackets represents the additional benefitß k k ßk
created for money holders of bank k that was earlier ignored by the competitive bank that treated aggregate
bank quality as a constant.  By treating its effect on aggregate quality as negligible, the bank not only
10
ignored its effect on demand through higher aggregate bank quality but also ignored the same sized effect
it creates for the K - 1 other banks in the system.  Because the value created for the banking system as a
whole is larger than what can be captured by the initiating bank, the optimal level of bank quality for the
banking system as a whole will be larger than the level arising in a competitive equilibrium.  Competitive
banks under-provide bank quality and this results in lower quality banks in equilibrium.  Note that both
banks and their customers lose from the inability to internalize the quality externality.  Compared to the
transaction costless case where such externalities were internalized, a competitive banking system under
free entry would likely consist of smaller sized banks, each providing relatively more service and offering
lower deposit rates.33
The importance of the bank quality externality and associated multiplicity of equilibria is that its presence
creates an ongoing incentive for market participants to restructure property rights or adopt
institutional/organizational innovations to internalize the externality and so avoid rent dissipation.  For
example, if the current banks could cooperate, all market participants (both existing banks and current
money holders) could share in the rents created by a coordinated expansion of each bank’s level of bank
quality.  From a transactions perspective, many institutional innovations in banking can be interpreted in just
such a manner.  For example, the evolution of the clearing-house system (as described by White) may be
interpreted as one mechanism by which incumbent banks can coordinate simultaneous quality improvement
while preventing and/or excluding free-riders.  The adoption of money exchange at par and the use of the
reflux mechanism to police the individual incentive to free-ride on aggregate quality allows coordinated bank
action to traverse Nash equilibria and focus on the dominate zero inflation rate, stable price level solution.34
In this sense, the mutual convertibility of bank monies at par with each other generates a mechanism for
bringing about greater money quality.  The  transactions costs savings for both banks and their clients
relative to the institutional alternative of coordinating monetary exchange through flexible, varying exchange
prices suggests that this coordinating institution will dominate its competitor.
The alternative (or complementary) private mechanism for internalization is bank consolidation.  Because
each bank shares in an improvement in aggregate quality in relation to its share of the overall market, there
is an incentive to capture more of the potential benefits through increased size, either through expansion or
merger.  The historical tendency for banks to consolidate within their market areas speaks to its ability to
internalize ever larger portions of the network externalities present in banking.  This tendency may be
reinforced by the other technical scale economies often argued to be present in banking–for example, the
ability to economize on money inventory holdings (a la Edgeworth) and the ability to combine sectors of`
the banking system whose synchronization of money inflows and outflows results in less aggregate variability
when combined.35
Historically, internalization through consolidation has been resisted.  Because the growth in market size
often coincides with the growth of market power, what is gained through greater internalization of technical
externalities may be lost through the incentive to reduce quantity artificially and raise the bid-ask spread in
intermediation.  In comparison, at least in the Scottish free-banking period, the ability to coordinate industry
performance through a clearing house did not interfere with entry, innovation and a healthy and competitive
11
banking environment (White, 1995).  
V. Time Inconsistency and the Cheating Problem
The sections above argue that transaction cost considerations suggest that if a competitive banking system
continues to operate through time, then such a banking system will evolve an institutional structure that will
reinforce the individual bank’s incentive to provide stable money prices.  This is the theoretic underpinning
for a bank clearing house system.  It remains to drop the assumption that money holders can accurately
foresee either the purchasing power of bank money or the quantity of bank notes outstanding.   This
reintroduces the threat that banks may profit by overexpanding the note issue and inflating faster than
current money holders can anticipate.  Hence even if competitive banks would produce stable prices if they
continued to operate, a competitive money system will not be viable unless banks can credibly commit to
continued performance at predictably stable money prices.
Costly information means that money holders will not always be able (nor will they care) to distinguish
between episodes of deliberate short run deception and imperfect control and/or normal operating
mistakes.  Both impose a cost in terms of foregone bank performance and the predictable money value.
However, recurring periods of short run deception cannot represent a viable long run solution strategy for
competitive banking.  Not only will any and all deliberate redistribution strategies become recognized, but
the anticipation of being taken advantage of in the future will lead both banks and money holders to an
equilibrium that incorporates sufficient safeguards to make long term cheating unprofitable.   What is true36
is that the necessary monitoring and enforcement actions taken will make that equilibrium viable more costly
than if information could be provided and deception or mistake policed costlessly.  For both parties jointly,
the willingness of individuals to pay a premium for both stable and stationary money prices means that
industry rents will be maximized when this level is provided in the most cost effective manner.
There remains the strategy of printing sufficient notes (issuing new deposits) in the short run that by the time
discovery is realized, the income redistributed from current money holders will more than offset the present
value of the gain that the bank could realize from adhering to traditional banking behaviour over the long
run.  In Klein and Leffler (1981), these tradeoff possibilities are set out formally and Klein (1975) argues
that with distinct monies and flexible money exchange prices, brand name capital may be sufficient to
overcome this cheating problem.  In essence, the bank will post a bond in terms of specific capital that
would be lost should an attempt at cheating be discovered.  In White (1999, p. 236), this potential solution
is challenged.  For White the gain available from capitalizing on any temporary departure between actual
and expected prices can be made infinite, making infinite monetary expansion the predictable profit
maximizing outcome.  If such an expansionary strategy becomes feasible, knowledge of that result will
prevent a fiat money banking system from ever being established.  For White (1999, p.239),  the only
viable alternative is for private issuers to write a contract obligating them to buy back their money at a
predetermined rate, i.e., issue a redemption contract.
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From a transactions perspective, what is missing from the above analysis is a demonstration of how a one-
time ripoff can be managed economically.  That is, given the traditional scale at which any bank can
operate, an undiscovered instantaneous infinite expansion of a bank money might simply not be feasible.
Rather, any sudden expansion of the note issue at a sufficient rate to realize the net redistributive gain
necessary to offset the rent to continued normal behaviour might be detected before the gain to such
deception could be fully realized.  Given that no single agent is willing to hold even temporarily a very large,
let alone infinite, quantity of any bank money, any deception strategy must be pursued in secret through
transaction sizes small enough not to trigger immediate alarm.  In this sense every episode of deception
requires a strategy of misbehaviour taking place over real time that if detected would reveal the anticipated
deception.  
In Hayek’s institutional case, where the money acquired in trade and not held by the individual is exchanged
through the money market, any unanticipated increase in the volume of one bank’s money will immediately
result in a depreciation of its current exchange value.  Without knowing the cause, the change in the
exchange ratio signals overissuance.  While day-to-day fluctuations in bank money values are expected,
such expected fluctuations are already being evaluated relative to expected bank quality so that any unusual
or “unexpected” depreciation in exchange value will trigger alarm and further depreciation.  The exchange
market is then Hayek’s transmission mechanism for signalling performance and so permitting the
penalization of banks that cannot fulfill their promise of price stability.  Such a feedback limits the size of
the redistributive gain that any initiating bank can realize.  In the absence of costless honesty, sceptical
money holders are protected by the bank’s inability to transact a sufficient quantity of nominal money to
realize a sufficient real gain given the time before such deliberate cheating is detected.37
The institutional alternative of coordinating money exchange through a bank clearing house system requires
the mutual acceptance of each member’s bank notes at a fixed rate of exchange (often par) and maintenance
of the promise to redeem surrendered monies in terms of other bank monies.  Here the cheating problem
is revealed in terms of the gap between expected and actual clearing quantities rather than expected and
actual prices.  From a Coasean perspective, a clearing house arrangement requiring immediate redemption
at fixed prices places liability for monitoring individual bank performance directly on the agents who first
receive information of an overissue.  That is, should an attempted infinite expansion be successful, the cost
of cheating will fall primarily on the partner banks and the clearing house caught in the deception.  More
generally, because any reduction in aggregate money quality reduces the demand for each member’s bank
money when one bank free-rides on industry credibility, competitive banks collectively have an incentive to
monitor each others behaviour rigorously. The reflux mechanism, by which bank liabilities that the public at
large is unwilling to hold (at the fixed price) flow back to the issuing bank for redemption is then the
mechanism by which free-riding is enforced and information on larger scale cheating is revealed.  Under
competition, banks both individually and collectively can be counted upon to monitor each others
performance.  
For nonbank money holders who are protected from individual bank expansion by such diligence, the more
general fear is that neither of the two information institutions signal an attempt by banks collectively from
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expanding at the expense of their nonbank customers.  In this case neither the net clearings of the bank
clearing house nor the exchange values of one money relative to each other can be relied upon to signal the
unexpected depreciation of all bank monies.  It is in relation to this latter problem that a competitive money
system may require further anchoring.
As mentioned earlier, it is White’s belief that a bank’s promise to maintain the stable purchasing power of
its money is not credible so that any contract based on this promise is not be viable.   Rather, bank money
becomes credible only when each bank writes a contract binding them to buy back their issued money on
demand at a price fixed in terms of something real--i.e. by making money redeemable or convertible into
some outside good(s) at a predictably fixed exchange rate.   It follows that when all banks maintain this38
promise with respect to an outside good (or group of goods), price level stability is maintained not only for
each bank individually but also for the banking system as a whole.   For White this is viable because the39
convertibility promise can be enforced while other such promises, such as the promise to maintain constant
purchasing power or a given rate of growth of bank money, cannot be enforced.  In principle, however, any
promise (contract) can be cheated upon and any departure between an expected and actual value can be
used to redistribute large (potentially infinite) amunts of wealth.  What is then implicit in White’s position is
not that cheating on a convertibility contract is impossible, but that such cheating will be discovered before
sufficient wealth can be redistributed to make the action worthwhile.  In essence, enough behavioural
information is revealed so that the gap between expected and actual prices closes fast enough to keep losses
below the return that can be earned by maintaining the promise.   Knowing this the strategy is not40
undertaken and both banks and bank money retain credibility.
VI. Indirect Convertibility as a Rule for Bank Credibility 
White’s suggestion that one particular type of bank contract guaranteeing price stability is enforceable while
others are not directs attention towards the behaviour that would signal cheating and hence the information
required to enforce each contractual alternative.  In this sense even White’s proposed solution is not
encouraging.  While convertibility on demand immediately withdraws bank reserves and so indicates whether
the bank’s outstanding note issue is backed with sufficient reserves, the information needed before a
sceptical money holder chooses to challenge the bank’s issuing practice is much more vague and nebulous.
For example, should individual money holders look only at actual relative to “implicitly” promised price levels
before choosing to redeem their money holdings, then the promise of convertibility will be no protection from
cheating if there is a sufficient lag between the money supply increase and the resulting price change.  The
maintenance of the promise to redeem on demand until the damage is revealed is part of the initial fraud and
comes too late to prevent the issuer from profiting from the strategy.
The theoretic import of White’s observation that only convertibility contracts have been successful in practice
is that this mechanism for enforcing bank behaviour does not rely the revelation of a gap between expected
and actual prices to be activated.  Should deceptive behaviour be suspected, the remedy of withdrawl can
be effected before the outcome can be realized, so rewarding early detectors. It is the ability to act prior to
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the revelation of unexpected high prices that allows the vaguer promise of price level stability by each bank
to be monitored more effectively and hence makes the convertibility contract more credible.  On the other
hand, the reflux mechanism that polices bank performance relies primarily on other banks to quickly signal
incompetence and/or deception.  Such a system gives much less protection to outside money holders when
the system expands in concert.  In such cases, individual money holders must monitor the loss of aggregate
purchasing power which harder for them to detect and again tends to be revealed only after the redistribution
at their expense has taken place.
This latter consideration suggests that if the money creation process in a competitive banking system could
be made more transparent and predictable so that possibly fraudulent behaviour could be detected much
earlier and hence made less profitable, the promise of price level stability would be more reliable and may
become enforceable economically.  For these reasons a contractual banking arrangement such as that
provided under indirect convertibility may well provide a superior institutional context for guaranteeing price
stability than does the fixed price-convertibility on demand contract advocated by White.   Indirect41
convertibility, i.e., the adoption of a money rule by a bank that promises price stability through the
requirement to buy and sell its bank money into an outside nonbank commodity (or financial asset) at
favourable market terms whenever an independent forecast of its money prices diverges from its stability
target, allows for ex ante observations that allow for not only the external monitoring of relative bank
performance (as does fixed price convertibility) but also the assessment of absolute performance (the
probability of maintaining the promise of stable money prices).  The adoption of an indirect convertibility
contract by banks requires each to fulfil a series of well specified actions whenever publicly transmitted
forecasts of expected future bank prices, rather than simply current prices, diverge from target.  Non
compliance in any one of these required actions then signals immediately the unwillingness of the bank to
maintain its commitment well in advance of the results of noncompliance showing up in the market.  It is then
the ability or inability of the bank to follow the rule that allows intentions to be inferred and hence allows the
gap between expected and actual prices to be closed more quickly than otherwise.  Indirect convertibility
provides the rules under which observable actions sufficient to maintain price stability can be generated and
this means that expected prices can then be conditioned on observed behaviour.  In just such a way can
bank price expectations be endogenized to minimize the size of the potential loss that could be realized
through cheating.  Because the indirect convertibility rule completely specifies acceptable banking behaviour,
unacceptable bank behaviour is more easily observed so that mistakes or deceptions are more easily and
quickly discovered.  The profit maximizing promise of price stability becomes more credible because the
process of money supply creation is more transparent and open to external evaluators.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper the case made by Klein and Hayek for a competitive banking system without government’s
necessary involvement was reexamined and found to be coherent and feasible but somewhat incomplete.
In particular, I have argued that a transactions perspective can be used to fill in the gaps and underline the
information and enforcement environment needed to make the promise of a stable money credible.  To do
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so I have argued that a fixed price, convertibility-on-demand contract is not sufficient  to create and/or
maintain  credibility.  Rather the convertibility requirement must be combined with potentially observable
information that could signalling fraudulent behaviour so that enforcers can anticipate forthcoming increases
in product prices.  In this sense a money rule such as that supplied by indirect convertibility can supplement
the many strengths of the on-demand convertibility contract recognized by White in his case for free banking.
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1.  The ideas in this paper grew out of a series of discussions with Jack Galbraith on the contributions of
Hayek, Klein and White.  While our differences in detail are sufficient to merit separate analysis, there is
no doubt that my analysis would not developed without his stimulating criticism. 
2.  I focus on money’s role in relation to trade rather than production and/or accumulation.  In a more
general model, banks would specialize in funding location-specific investment projects by firms a la`
Chant (1992).
3.  Note that Klein does this explicitly (p.424) whereas Hayek assumes that the cheating problem is
overcome relatively easily.  For example, Hayek writes that “[a]s soon as the public became familiar
with the new possibilities, any deviation from the straight path of providing an honest money would at
once lead to the rapid displacement of the offending currency by others”.
4.  With all exchange prices known, the fiat monies assumed to be present and used in this model are all
equally credible, redeemable and convertible.  The problem of bank credibility and the question of
whether fiat bank monies can have positive value is then an information cost problem.  How best this
problem is solved is the subject of Section V.  
5.  See, for example, the papers in Starr (1989). 
6.  See Alchian (1977).
7.  Different services may appeal to different customers as a function of their anticipated trading volume
and/or type of transaction.
8.  In this model it is assumed that the return on savings available to the household, i  is a constant thathh,
is more than would be received when holding bank money, r , and less than any particular bank canmk
earn on its nonliquid asset, i .  Hence we assume that i  > i  > r . This reflects the assumed transactionj j hh mk
cost structure where banks specialize in finding suitable lending opportunities and face lower costs than
do households of discovering, monitoring and policing these location-specific opportunities.  For a more
general and well developed analysis along these lines see Chant (1992). 
9.  In Hayek’s analysis, individual banks can choose different baskets of goods on which sell “price
stability” and this becomes another element of competition.  Our analysis assumes that to make
comparisons across different monies, money prices are all calculated relative to the same bundle of
goods.  Hence p  measures the number of units of K’s monies required to purchase a unique bundle ofk
consumption goods.
10.  Note that for an individual using money k, Mv /Mx  / v  = (p /p ){(x  - x )/[(x  - x ) ] }.  Notei ij Xij jk k ij ij ij ije e 2 1/2
that the numerator and denominator of the term in curly brackets are of the same absolute value. 
Notes
19
However the denominator is always positive while the numerator can be positive or negative depending
upon whether x  > x  or x  < x .  Thus v  = (-1) (p /p ) where c = 1 if x  < x  and c = 2 if x  > x .ij ij ij ij Xij jk k ij ij ij ije e c e e
11.  See Jones (1976).
12.  See, for example, Fried (1970) on the shopping demand for money and Whalen (1981) and Ferris
(1981) on the precautionary demand for money.
13.  We follow Klein in defining bank quality as the variance of the bank’s money prices.
14.  This requires either M /p , ß , or ß to effect t .  The first link is the ususal way that money isik k k v
introduced into a model (see Savings, for example).  But the same reasoning suggests that increases in
both ß  and ß will have similar effects, either directly or indirectly through their effect on holdings ofk
M /p .ik k
15.  For two goods, j and m, the marginal rate of substitution can be found from(3) to be   U /U   =Xij Xim
p (1 + (-1) t )/p (1 + (-1) t ).  Hence for two goods that are either both purchased or both beingjk v jm vc c
sold, the common transaction cost term will cancel out of the relative price.  Hence abstracting from
income effects, the same relative quantities of the two goods will be chosen as in the zero transaction
cost case.  However, when the comparison is across goods where one is being sold and the other being
purchased, the wedge is compounding in its effect.  Because individuals differ by initial endowments and
tastes, types and quantities of money demanded may differ across individuals who face common
transactions costs and commodity prices.
16.  This is the equivalent of equation (12.1) in White’s model of Klein (White, 1999, p.229). 
17.  We follow Klein in thinking of a specific bank’s money quality in terms of the variance (rather than
level) of its money prices.  Expected changes in the price level and its rate of change of prices can (and
will) be compensated for in the money rate of return paid in k denominated notes (accounts).  A less
predictable money with the same expected value has more risk and hence is of lower quality (at the
same price). 
18.  Given the definition of bank quality it would be natural to think of the quality of the banking system
as a whole as the variance of a portfolio of different bank prices where the weights in the portfolio
correspond to the real share of that bank money in the aggregate transactions undertaken in the
economy.  That is, 
   ß / Variance (ß ’s) /  s  = 3 s s  + 3  3 2s s s s ? ,      where  k, j = 1,...K,  and j k, k ß k k k j k j k j k jk2 2 2
where s  is the variance of bank k’s money prices (bank k quality), s  is the share of bank k money in2k k
the aggregate money supply, and ?  is the coefficient of correlation between the money prices of bank jjk
and bank k.  Note that for subgroups of banks, the variance of the portfolio could be smaller than the
weighted sum of individual variances.  This would arise if period-specific prices are negatively
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correlated across banks.  In section IV below we show that aggregate quality will involve more than
just this consideration.
19.  In terms of the demand for money function developed thus far, a key difference between the
approaches of Hayek and Klein is Hayek’s tendency to assume independence among the demands for
bank monies [in our terminology, (M/p)  = 0] while Klein tends to emphasize (exaggerate?) theß
externality present in this effect.
20.  For our analysis the gross interest rate, i, set on bonds and/or loans is treated as exogenous.  More
generally i is determined in the aggregate market for bank loans, where all banks compete for business
across adjacent boundaries with competitor banks and final consumers (who can always lend directly).
21.  The ability to acquire resources by issuing notes or loans on the expectation of a price level that
cannot be sustained is the cheating incentive facing banks and their customers.  Our starting information
assumption rules away this cheating possibility.  We reconsider this possibility in later sections.
22.  We also assume that these costs are increase at an increasing rate so that c  and c  are alsoss ßß
positive.  Although we have not specified a distinctive cost function for each bank, there would be no
new problem introduced by allowing each bank to have distinctive characteristics that translate into cost
differences.  In all cases, however, we would still require it to be increasingly costly to provide higher
levels of service and price quality. 
23.  By dividing (7) by (M /p ) , (8) by (M /p ) , and (9) by (M /p ) it can be seen that at thek k r k k s k k ßk k k
optimum, the marginal cost of adding another real balance through either pecuniary return, level of
service, or bank quality will be equalized.
24.  When one approaches the demand for money through the utility function, as does Klein (and many
others), it is perhaps natural to see the avoidance of the cheating problem as the additional way by
which either a determinate price level or a determinate rate of change of money prices can be
introduced into the analysis.  We argue below that the transactions perspective leads more naturally to a
demand for price stability as well as predictability.
25.  If transactions costs are ignored, the assumption of perfect information on nominal quantities and
prices leaves little to distinguish between a banking system that fixes nominal prices and maintains real
values through a nominal bank clearing mechanism (White’s note exchange) versus one that allows
money prices to vary and uses banks competition for customers to determine the nominal quantity that
results in the desired level of real balances.  Our case for the transactions approach is that the choice
between these clearing arrangements is only partly dependent on the information problem that is here
temporarily suppressed.  We return to this issue in Section V where information is costly and deception
is possible. 
26.  While there is no need for individual banks or individual groups of bank customers to choose the
same basket in which to either target or measure the purchasing power of each bank’s money,
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comparability across monies becomes easier when the same basket is used.  For this reason we
proceed under the assumption that there is agreement on the bundle of goods whose price level is
stabilized. 
27.  This generalizes the traditional transaction cost reasoning for why money holders prefer the single
money that has the lowest price variance about any predictable rate of growth.  
28.  In Hayek’s words (1976, p.29) ,”...there is no reason to doubt that private enterprise whose
business depended on succeeding in the attempt could keep stable the value of a money it issued.” 
29.  While we argue that all customers will prefer price level stability, customers can vary in their
preference for service versus pecuniary return.  Hence in the absence of strong economies of scale,
there is no particular reason to expect that a homogenous bank will emerge in equilibrium. 
30.  Hayek writes (1976, p. 43), “And it should be in the power of each issuer of a distinct currency to
regulate its quantity so as to make it most acceptable to the public – and competition would force him
to do so.  Indeed, he would know that the penalty for failing to fulfill the expectations raised would be
the prompt loss of the business”. 
31.  See footnote 18.
32.  Note that the increase in transactions costs through lower industry quality is distributed
asymmetrically for customers of the single bank that chooses to diverge from the standard industry
inflation rate.  Because the diverging bank it is small relative to the market, its customers will find that
the majority of their transactions are in terms of new prices while the customers of other banks will find
only a small subset of their transaction prices will have changed. 
33.  Note that the number and size of firms in the competitive equilibrium could be larger or smaller than
the socially optimal norm, depending on the size of the aggregate quality effect and on whether services
and quality are substitutes or complements in consumption.
34.  In terms of the model, the requirement of mutual convertibility at par means that p  - p  = 0 andk mean
mutual adaption to p = 0 means that spillover effects of improved individual bank quality are
reciprocated by each of the other banks in the system.  Note that a clearing-house system requires
banks either to hold each other’s notes as reserves or to use some third commodity (e.g. gold) to
handle inter bank settlements.  
35.  If consolidation reduces the number of market participants sufficiently and raises the scale required
of entrants such that entry control can now be realized, the incentive facing incumbents may well turn to
realizing the more typical monopoly returns associated with regulated entry. There is then a ongoing
tension between effects of greater bank cooperation on the incentive to internalize market externalities
and the incentive to use the resulting market power. 
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36.  That is, time inconsistency does not exclude the possibility that there exists a competitive
equilibrium in which cheating will not arise.  Such an equilibrium would appear to be dominated by one
where cheating is not possible, but such an equilibrium assumes (counterfactually) that cheating is
costless to prevent. 
37.  Flexible exchange rates across bank monies allows more independence to individual banks and so
imposes more of the detection costs on individual money holders.  Given that information costs of
monitoring bank performance are nonrival, the costs of organizing individual money holders may
encourage free-riding and hence result in underprovision. 
38. In White’s analysis, the case for convertibility is self evident. He writes (1989, p.20), “Within a
free-banking system, where there are many issuing banks but no government sponsored central bank,
convertibility prevails naturally without any legislature imposing it.  Convertibility arises simply from the
contract agreement made by each issuer on the face of each note to redeem that note on demand for a
specific quantity of specie.”   
39.  With all banks successfully pursuing price stability, the exchange ratio across bank monies would
remain constant so that a clearing arrangement across banks then becomes feasible.
40.  Prior to the clearing arrangement, however, individual customers must monitor bank behaviour so
that the “on demand” clause becomes the mechanism for policing bank credibility. 
41.  For more on indirect convertibility and its relative strength in maintaining an inflation target see
Ferris and Galbraith (2002).
